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Although donor discourse on international development policy places less emphasis 
on civil society than formerly this paper present evidence from Tanzania, Ethiopia 
and Central America that aid for civil society has had a positive effect on the capacity 
of Southern civil society.  As a result of international pressure, civil society in these 
developing states now face a more open environment for both advocacy and service 
provision, while financial support has allowed a much greater level of activity than 
would otherwise have been possible.  This article is drawn from a larger study funded 
by the Advisory Board for Irish Aid, which examined the potential role of civil society 
in poverty reduction.  It identifies the current threat to the continued development of 
civil society as coming from the narrowing of the potential role of civil society in the 
OECD aid harmonisation agenda and management and capacity constraints on the 
part of donors that curtails their engagement with this type of support. 
 




Donor discourse on international development policy currently places less emphasis 
on civil society than formerly1. This change of focus is in the context of the 
widespread acceptance of formal representative democracy as an international norm, 
the continuing development failure in Sub Saharan Africa and the increased level of 
international security instability – a set of circumstances which has shifted the policy 
priority from promoting democracy to ensuring effective governance for development, 
and intervention in civil conflicts and situations of state failure.   This is in contrast to 
the early 1990s when donors began to focus strongly on strengthening civil society to 
the extent that one influential study argued that by the mid 1990s ‘…the general 
notion that civil society development is critical to democratisation [became] a new 
mantra in both aid and diplomatic circles’2, with the result that donor policy placed 
significant emphasis on the role of civil society in economic and political 
development.  The practical outcome of this policy focus in terms of the engagement 
with and funding for Southern civil society has been subject to extensive criticism, 
primarily for its crudeness, insensitivity to local conditions and the instrumental use of 
local groups to further donor policy priorities.3  These criticisms were matched by 
numerous practical problems for donors, engaged in funding civil society.4  During 
this initial period of funding activity, civil society was viewed as a vehicle to push the 
state towards democracy by insisting on accountability and transparency.  As part of 
the new ‘good governance’ agenda the projected role of civil society has become 
more circumscribed and has been institutionalised as playing a consultative role in 
state led policy processes and development programmes.  As a corollary to this the 
central role of the state in development has been re-affirmed in donor policy.5
 
The role of civil society in development, and the part that development agencies 
might play in supporting civil society has therefore been through a very significant 
period of flux that has raised questions about the efficacy and nature of civil society 
engagement.  A study published in 2000 found that in spite of donor support and its 
focus on the advocacy role of civil society, there was very little evidence that 
southern civil society had developed the capacity to fulfil this role – which seemed to 
point to a failure in donor policy.6  In the light of recent changes in the development 
policy environment, this paper analyses the results of studies of civil society groups 
carried out in Tanzania, Ethiopia and Central America in 2005-6 that investigated 
                                                 
1 Notwithstanding a new interest in social movements which even extends to the World Bank. 
2 Ottaway and Carothers, 2000 
3 Van Rooy, 1998; Howell, 2000; Howell and Pearce, 2002; Edwards and Hulme, 1995. 
4 CIS, 2007b: 16-17. 
5 For example see DIFID, 2006.  
6 Ottaway and Carothers, 2000.  
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their perspectives on their role in development and poverty alleviation; the policy 
space in which they operate, particularly the PRSP; and their relationships with 
national governments, donors, INGOs and other civil society groups.  It also 
discusses the issue of gender which the 2000 study considered to be the one area of 
advocacy success for CSOs.  
 
While this article focuses on the perspectives of Southern civil society organisations, 
it draws on a wider study of the role of civil society in poverty alleviation, which was 
conducted for and funded by the Advisory Board for Irish Aid.  The study was 
particularly important in Ireland given the rapidly increasing aid budget and the strong 
support given to Irish development NGOs by Irish Aid.  The wider study also 
examined the perspectives of official donors and of Irish development NGOs on the 
role of both Northern NGOs and Southern civil society in development; possible 
lessons from Ireland’s own development experience and in particular the role of 
social partnership; and it made policy recommendations on the future direction of 
Irish Aid’s policy on engagement with civil society for consideration by the Advisory 
Board.7   In this context, it will first discuss the changing role of civil society in donor 
policy discourse.  Then, following a brief introduction to the political and economic 
conditions in each country, the article moves on to analyse the detail of the interviews 
conducted with civil society organisations in Tanzania, Ethiopia and Central America, 
focusing on issues of dependency, influence and reach; the PRSP process and the 
development of advocacy; and the particular experience of groups focused on 
gender issues.   
 
 
Civil society in development policy 
 
The conceptual shift from the idea of a ‘minimal’ to an ‘effective’ state and a focus on 
citizen participation through an active civil society is embedded in the World 
Development Report (WDR) 1997.8  This report laid the foundation for the World 
Bank’s ‘Comprehensive Development Framework’ (CDF) in 1998, which replaced 
structural adjustment programmes.  The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, which 
were to be a state led process, were developed as the vehicle for implementing the 
CDF and were intended to provide a framework for domestic policies and 
                                                 
7 The working papers from the full project are available on the website of Dublin City University’s Centre 
for International Studies,  http://www.dcu.ie/~cis/civilsociety.html. They can be downloaded and 
referenced provided they are cited and acknowledged. 
8  See for example Doornbos 2001: 98; Slater and Bell 2002: 343. 
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programmes on poverty reduction, as well as a context for improved coordination of 
international development assistance.9  The inclusion of civil society, it was believed, 
would strengthen the process in two ways; by increasing equity through its assumed 
pro-poor orientation, and by building consensus around development policies and 
outcomes, because a wide range of interests would be represented in the wording of 
the final document.10   Importantly, it was also seen as fulfilling a good governance 
function, by acting as a watchdog on the actions of government, and improving 
accountability and transparency in the political system. 
 
In this model, the service provision role envisaged for both Northern NGOs and 
Southern civil society followed the pattern established for civil society in developed 
states in the context of neo-liberal reforms.11  They were to provide innovative ideas 
and solutions, as well as strengthening the impact of development programmes by 
providing local knowledge.  In addition to this, they were to provide services in post 
conflict situations or humanitarian crises where the state was weak or absent.12
 
The advocacy role which is a feature of the policy perspective of many international 
donors13 is muted in the World Bank’s view of civil society’s role. Civil society is 
described as providing a voice for the poor and marginalised.  The idea that civil 
society will contribute to an enabling environment for ‘good’ governance represents a 
weakening of the view of civil society as a key element and promoter of democracy.  
More limiting still is the idea that civil society’s role is promoting local ownership of 
the PRSP process and reform programme.  The Bank has a particular interpretation 
of the term ‘local ownership’ which is counter intuitive, as it means that a country has 
accepted and internalised the policy programmes favoured by the World Bank.  The 
Bank links the concept of ‘ownership’ with the acceptance of World Bank policy as 
expressed through conditionalities.14
 
In the Bank’s view, a key role for civil society in developing states is promoting and 
engaging with the PRSP process.  Since the introduction of the PRSPs, the World 
Bank and bilateral donors have strengthened the ‘governance’ agenda as part of the 
allocation of aid, and as a result improving ‘governance’ has become a key part of 
the donor focus on aid effectiveness and harmonisation.  PRSPs are now the major 
                                                 
9  DFID, 2006: 120; World Bank, 2004, 2006. 
10  World Bank , 2002: 239. 
11 Connolly, 2007.  
12 World Bank, 2005. 
13 See CIS, 2007b.    
14  World Bank, 2005: 13. 
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vehicle through which donors and IFIs are harmonising aid to participating countries, 
and through which they expect progress towards the MDG targets to be made. This 
is particularly significant in the context of the international declarations on aid 
harmonisation and aid effectiveness; the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
(2005) and the associated Rome Declaration on Harmonisation (2003) which reflect 
and formalise a process that was already underway amongst key donors.15  A core 
assumption of this policy is that national development plans, including the PRSPs, 
are evolved through a democratic process, to which local civil society groups have 
contributed.  On this basis it is implicitly assumed that civil society (including both 
foreign and local civil society organisations) should work within the framework of 
these plans or be contractors to central government/donors in delivering the plan.   
 
The study by Ottaway and Carothers, assessing the effectiveness of donor 
engagement at the end of the 1990s, examined the impact of civil society based 
approaches to democracy promotion at micro, meso and macro levels, using case 
studies from Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Latin America.16  The 
findings on the effectiveness of funding for civil society in the 1990s are revealing.   
At the micro level, the impact of civil society assistance was found to be ‘nothing 
short of dramatic’, the funding had created and kept alive thousands of NGOs in the 
assisted countries.  The report also found that the form of civil society aid used in this 
period had implanted the idea, that NGOs represent the model of what civil society in 
democratic countries, should be, to the possible detriment of other types of civil 
society organisations.  
 
At the macro and meso levels, the key question addressed in the study was whether 
civil society was stronger and played a more important role in political life as a result 
of assistance from donors – with success being measured in terms of the capacity to 
engage in advocacy.  Success on the advocacy front varied considerably; in Africa 
and the Middle East there was little effect on policy processes, while in Asia, Eastern 
Europe and Latin America the results were more positive, but even here policy work 
was often being carried out on behalf of citizens, with whom the NGOs often had little 
real contact, and thus it was not equivalent to the broader goals of interest 
                                                 
15 IDA/World Bank, 2007.  
16 Carnegie Endowment study on Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion: ‘Funding Virtue’ (Ottaway 
and Carothers 2000). This study is interesting as was undertaken before the current PRSP processes. 
The primary focus was US official aid but some aspects of the study also examined European aid. In 
this regard the case study on South Africa noted a striking similarity, even overlap and duplication, 
among donors’ themes and programmes (Landsberg 2000). 
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representation and citizen participation17.  However, NGOs that promoted women’s 
rights were found to be a major exception, in that this issue not only attracted donor 
funds, but could also gain widespread grassroots support.   At the macro level, the 
study found no evidence that civil society assistance was a major factor in the 
promotion of democracy, or that it had helped to create political pluralism.   It 
concluded that contrary to key donor aims, civil society was not creating a more 
pluralist political system, nor was it a key factor in promoting democracy, and at a 
lower level it was not even a very effective policy advocate.   This study argues that 
from the late 1990s to the present, civil society has made progress in its capacity for 
advocacy at the meso and macro levels, with women’s organisations and groups 





Southern Civil Society post 2000: Tanzania, Ethiopia and Central America 
 
This aspect of the wider study is based on work carried out in Tanzania, Ethiopia and 
Central America during 2005 and 2006.  The two Sub Saharan African case studies 
were chosen from Irish Aid’s programme countries for the contrast in the structure of 
the state, level of civil society development, and state civil society relations.  The type 
of state is important as civil societies in all contexts emerge in response to the form 
of the state, and the political opportunity structure provided by the state.  An added 
factor in developing states is that of the presence of donors and the availability of 
donor funding for civil society, which provides an additional layer of ‘opportunity 
structure’ and would be expected to influence the structure and focus of civil society.  
In addition donor engagement with states may influence the degree of openness of 
public space for civil society engagement.   
 
Tanzania is a stable, multi-ethnic state, with diverse religious affiliations, and a 
defacto one-party state, not withstanding the institution of multiparty democracy in 
1995.  During the following years the strength of the governing CCM party has 
increased (winning 80% of the vote in the 2005 presidential elections) and the 
political opposition has remained weak and fragmented.  The strengthening of the 
government party to the point where a viable alternative government for voters does 
not exist is a trend in democratic African states which could have implications for 
                                                 
17 The relationship between most donor-supported civil society organisations and the constituency in 




donors’ funding relationship with those states.  Ethiopia represents an alternative 
African experience in that it is a post-conflict state that has recently emerged from a 
prolonged period of ethnic conflict and which currently has a federal state structure 
reflecting ethnic divisions, but with highly contested elections for political power at the 
centre.  Tanzania and Ethiopia are both extremely aid dependent with very high 
levels of absolute poverty.   Central America, also an Irish Aid area of interest, was 
chosen as an international comparator that, while still emerging from the conflicts of 
the 1970s and 1980s, is now composed of democracies with longer historic roots 
than the African cases and is also more integrated into the international economy.  
Their civil societies are more developed in that they have a greater density of 
organisations, higher capacity and a longer history of engagement (if a conflictual 
one) with the state.  Also, while Tanzania and Ethiopia lack the social and economic 
cleavages that have formed the basis for both political parties and political activism in 
established democracies of the Global North, the countries of central America have 
political party systems and civil societies that are highly polarised on distributional 







Table 1 – Comparative social indicators,  2005 
 






HDI placing 162 170 112 117 104 117 47 4 
Gini co-efficient on inequality 0.38 0.30 0.43 0.55 0.53 0.6 0.47 0.36 
% below national  poverty line 36% 44% 48% 53% 48% 56% 22% 9% 
% living on les than $1 per day 60% 90% 45% 21% 31% 16% 2% 0 


















Av. Life expectancy (years) 46 48 70 68 71 67 78 78 
Gender Development Index 80 n/a 88 n/a 80 94 44 50 




Table 1 sets out basic social and economic indicators for the seven countries 
involved in the study, along with Ireland for comparative purposes.  It shows both the 
deep poverty across all the countries in this study and also some significant 
variations.  Life expectancy in Tanzania and Ethiopia is a clear indicator of the depth 
of poverty there and the impact of AIDS – even compared to the poorest Central 
American countries. However even though the GDP per capita in Central America is 
much higher than the African countries, even for the poorest countries in the region, 
they still experience very significant percentages of their population living in deep 
poverty, with the percentage living below $1 per day in Nicaragua, not much lower 
than Tanzania.  If national poverty lines are used only Costa Rica has a lower 
percentage of people in poverty than either Tanzania or Ethiopia. Clearly this is 
related to the much worse internal inequality in Central America as indicated by the 
Gini coefficient figures.  
 
The study limited the civil society groups it surveyed to those whose aims and focus 
of work had an anti-poverty dimension.  For the three case studies this required a 
form of mapping exercise to establish lists of CSOs.18   From the mapping exercise, a 
picture of the recent development of civil society emerged.  The pattern of the 
foundation of the civil society groups surveyed, followed the changing pattern of 
donor interest in each case.  In Tanzania only 7% of CSOs had been set-up prior to 
1989, and 50% were formed between 1995 and 2000 – the period of highest donor 
interest internationally and also the period in which Tanzanian democracy 
developed.19   Only 12% of the Tanzanian groups surveyed had been formed after 
the year 2000, indicating a tailing off of CSO formation.  The Ethiopian study differs 
from the Tanzanian study in that there are a higher percentage of groups at either 
end of this time range, reflecting at one end the existence of some older CSOs in 
Ethiopia and at the other end of this time line, a slightly later liberalisation of the 
domestic political environment.20  37% of Ethiopian CSOs surveyed were formed 
between 1992 and 1999, reflecting the period of highest international donor interest 
in civil society and the major change in government in Ethiopia in 1992 following the 
defeat of the old Derge regime.  The later post-conflict liberalisation is also reflected, 
as almost one third of CSOs were formed after 2000.  In Central America the early 
1990s was the period when the vast majority of CSOs were formed – also reflecting 
the post conflict engagement by donors.  The level of engagement was not sustained 
                                                 
18 For details see full working papers on each case – CIS 2007d, 2007e, 2007f.  
19 CIS, 2007d: 17. 
20 CIS, 2007e: 17. 
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and despite new CSOs emerging, the total number of CSOs in the region mapped by 
the Arias Foundation’s Ceiba Data Base declined over the course of the 1990s.21
 
In Central America the extreme political polarisation of the states in the region 
impacts on the structure of civil society.  Civil society that emerged both during and 
after the recent conflicts in Central America, is well developed but it is both highly 
polarised and highly politicised.  It is fractured along a left-right cleavage, 
(representing those seeking radical structural change in society to deal with 
inequality, versus those broadly supportive of or at least accepting of the status quo) 
and this cleavage reflects the political purposes, which civil society organisations 
have served in the past.  On the left, social movements and community organisations 
supported political movements for change, and at the extreme armed guerrilla 
movements. On the right, conservative parties set up their own CSOs to perform 
charitable social functions, to attract foreign aid, and to compete with radical groups.  
The polarisation has been intensified by the US policy of funding CSOs in Central 
America, in a context strongly framed by its strategic foreign policy goals.  However, 
the groups most active in the civil space and on poverty issues have been on the 
broad left.  This is because the state itself has for the most part been dominated by 
those on the right.22       
 
Political opposition to the dominant parties of government also finds an outlet in civil 
society organisations in Tanzania and Ethiopia.  In Tanzania the absolute dominance 
of the ruling CCM in elections on the Tanzanian mainland and the absence of any 
opposition parties capable of offering a credible alternative government has meant 
that many people have chosen to play a role of critiquing the government from within 
civil society rather than opposition political parties.23   In Ethiopia the political system 
is highly polarised and while the ruling coalition which is in power since the overthrow 
of the old Derge regime won the last election comfortably, there was significant 
regional variation in support and the opposition won all seats in the capital city Addis 
Ababa.  Some CSOs are clearly government aligned and others are linked to the 
opposition.  In some regions CSOs are effectively organised on ethnic lines reflecting 
local demographic patterns.24   
 
                                                 
21 CIS, 2007f: 12.   
22 The research for this project was completed before the victory of the left in the Nicaraguan elections.  
It remains to be seen how civil society, which now strongly asserts its independence from political 
parties will adapt to the new political situation. 
23 CIS, 2007d: 9-12. 
24 CIS, 20073: 15 & 38. 
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The impact of the transition to democracy on civil society is still being felt as a 
process of change in each of the case studies.  In Central America it was 
experienced as an increased acceptance of the legitimacy of the state, irrespective of 
the political complexion of government and a recognition that it was necessary for 
civil society to engage with the state in order to achieve pro-poor outcomes.  The 
degree to which this idea, of state engagement, was supported varied considerably 
between individual states.  A section of civil society in the region was still adjusting 
from being an oppositional social movement, and fears were expressed that in 
accepting an advocacy role in the policy process, civil society were losing their 
capacity to seek more systematic and radical pro-poor changes.25  In Tanzania, the 
transition to democracy gradually opened up space for civil society. Initially as the 
single party state was dismantled and trade unions, women’s groups and youth 
groups became separated from that dominant party, establishing civil society 
organisations and gaining external funding became possible.  In the absence of any 
significant opposition parties, civil society provided a site for the critique of 
government, which has at times resulted in punitive actions being taken against 
individual groups.26   
 
In Ethiopia, the legacy of ethnic conflict, suspicion of the central institutions of state 
and lower levels of aid have been factors in stunting the development of civil society.  
In contrast to Tanzania, political opposition does exist in Ethiopia – there is a very 
active political opposition challenging for central state power, who oppose the ethnic 
power sharing and federalism of the current constitution and there are ethnically 
based opposition movements in different parts of the country.  The tensions arising 
from the wider political context, ongoing food insecurity and the toleration by the 
former Derge regime of international NGOs involved in food aid27  has meant that in 
Ethiopia Northern NGOs, with the support of the state, have tended to crowd out 
local civil society.  While the survey in Ethiopia did not pick up overtly expressed 
negative sentiments towards Northern NGOs, it was noticeable that at the national 
(as opposed to regional) level Northern NGOs were much more central to ‘domestic’ 
policy dialogue with government than in either Tanzania or Central America (in the 
context of a lower overall level of civil society engagement with the state). 
 
 
                                                 
25 CIS, 2007f: 27. 
26 For example restrictions were placed on the activities of Haki Elimu in 2006 following a dispute with a 
government minister. 
27 CIS, 2007f: 3. 
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 Issues of dependency, influence and reach 
 
Formal organised civil society in the three case studies is extremely donor dependent 
and that level of dependence is likely to continue into the future in the absence of 
internal sources of funding or a domestic support base with the resources to fund 
organised civil society activity.28  In Ethiopia, of those CSOs willing to discuss their 
income 98% received funds from donors or INGOs, with almost 60% of CSOs 
receiving more than 80% of their income from these sources. In Tanzania 93% of 
CSOs were funded by donors/INGOs, with over 60% of them receiving more than 
60% of their income from them.  Civil society groups themselves see no way out of 
this dependent relationship and only argue for greater freedom to determine their 
own priorities in both service provision and advocacy.29       
 
Donor funding has a limited direct reach down to smaller, local or community based 
civil society groups.  The problem of providing small grants to local groups with a 
potential to produce a significant anti-poverty impact for a very small outlay, which 
has been identified by donors, has been very difficult to implement in practice.   
Administrative and fiduciary requirements have meant that even ‘small grant’ 
schemes are beyond the capacity of their target groups.  Embassies do not have the 
staffing levels or expertise to allow them effectively engage with local groups.   Pool-
funded schemes combining the resources of a number of embassies have been no 
more successful.  These difficulties are well illustrated by the length and complexity 
of the application form for the pool-funded Foundation for Civil Society in Tanzania.  
The style of management and project planning information requested was completely 
beyond the capacity of the target groups and led many applicants to employ 
consultants to write their proposals.30  The Irish NGO Concern had a significant 
element of their civil society capacity building programme in Tanzania focused on 
building the capacity of locally organised groups to bring them to a point where they 
could apply for donor funding.31  
 
The areas of activity of civil society groups in the three cases (drawn from their stated 
aims) are extremely clustered around issues that have been prominent in donor 
agendas and points to the skewing of civil society activity by the availability of donor 
                                                 
28 CIS 2007d: 21; CIS 2007e: 24; CIS 2007f: 29. 
29 CIS 2007d: 22-23. 
30 CIS 2007d: 24. 
31 CIS, 2007d: 35. 
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funds for specific purposes, rather than to build the capacity of civil society in a more 
general sense.   This influence of donor funding patterns is especially clear in the two 
African cases and in the large proportion of groups, across all three case studies 
working on gender issues.  HIV-AIDS was the largest stated area of focus in both the 
African cases (37% in Ethiopia and 26% in Tanzania), followed by women’s rights / 
gender (32% and 22%) respectively.  In Ethiopia, despite very high levels of poverty 
and food insecurity almost 50% of CSOs are engaged in advocacy work on either 
HIV or women’s issues, and only 15% are engaged in service provision in the areas 
of ‘income generation’, ‘relief’ and ‘food security’.32  In Central America the areas of 
work were drawn from the Arias Foundation’s Ceiba Data Base which allows multiple 
areas to be selected. Here the single greatest area of focus was education and 
training – focused on capacity building rather than the mainstream school system.  
Almost half of all groups are involved in women’s rights and 31% said they were 
focused on the environment.33
 
This survey also confirms the sense that the focus of civil society organisations is 
shifting from service provision to ‘advocacy’.34  74% of Tanzania CSOs, 71% of 
Ethiopian CSOs and almost all Central America CSOs are involved in advocacy.35     
Advocacy is broadly defined by CSOs to include public education and information 
campaigns, promoting particular policy perspectives and representing group 
interests.  Those groups who receive direct support from donors and who appear to 
have the highest domestic profiles are primarily focused on advocacy.  However the 
areas of advocacy are again heavily skewed towards areas of donor interest. This 
was especially clear in Ethiopia which was the country with the lowest level of 





The PRSP process and the development of civil society advocacy 
 
The perception amongst the Southern civil society organisations surveyed is that the 
public space in which they operate has expanded in recent years and they have 
                                                 
32 CIS, 2007e: 18 & 38. 
33 CIS, 2007f: 12. 
34 CIS, 2007d: 18;  CIS, 2007e: 17-19; CIS, 2007f: 26. 
35 CIS, 2007d: 18;  CIS, 2007e: 18; CIS, 2007f: 27. 
36 CIS, 2007e: 18-19. 
37 CIS, 2007e: 35-36. 
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greater freedom to operate.38  In all cases the relationship between the state and civil 
society was considered to have improved.  This was a consensus view in Tanzania 
and Central America. Even in the more difficult environment in Ethiopia 64% of CSOs 
said that their operating environment had become more open in the last 5 years.39
 
Given that for donors and the World Bank, the PRSP process was intended both as 
the major anti-poverty strategy and a key vehicle for civil society engagement, to 
what extent has the PRSP processes been responsible for the improvement in the 
operating space experienced by civil society?  In Tanzania, which has been cited 
internationally as a blueprint for a successful PRSP process, the evidence that the 
framework provided by the PRSP process was an enabling one is the strongest of 
the cases studied.  In Ethiopia and the two Central American states with PRSP 
processes (Honduras and Nicaragua) the perceived impact of the PRSP in providing 
advocacy opportunities for civil society appears to have been minimal.   
 
In Tanzania the first PRSP process was widely seen as unsatisfactory by those 
CSOs who participated in it.  Following that process Tanzanian CSOs organised 
themselves to provide an effective engagement with the second PRSP in 2005.  
Considerable energy was put into engaging with the process nationally by high 
capacity NGOs and networks and they estimated that more than half a million people 
participated in the various fora held across the country.40  After the first PRSP, 
Tanzanian CSOs had been critical of the short timeframe available for organisation 
and therefore felt unprepared to meet the challenges of the process.  This was not 
the case with the second PRSP process, as civil society groups had established a 
network through which they could co-operate and were prepared for engagement in 
the process.  The experience left them dissatisfied with the process which they 
considered was primarily an engagement between the state and donors, into which 
they could have little effective input.  Involvement in the web of consultations, 
working groups and meetings that made up the PRSP process was considered by 
CSOs to be very time and resource intensive and they balanced this against their 
perception that much of the outcome was pre-determined. Their dissatisfaction is 
reflected by the fact that civil society membership of Poverty Monitoring System 
technical working groups, set up as part of the second PRSP has deteriorated. 
Today, there are only six civil society members across all four working groups, 
                                                 
38 This positive assessment was weakest in Ethiopia, CIS, 2007e: 21. 
39 CIS, 2007e: 21. 
40 Hakikazi Catalyst  (Tanzanian CSO) 2005 p6. 
 14
despite the fact that twelve places should be allocated to civil society.41  In 2006 the 
Policy Forum (the key NGO network in the country) reviewed its organisational 
strategy to reflect this dissatisfaction with government-led processes, including the 
PRSP.  It now selectively engages in only those policy processes which it feels it can 
enhance and influence.  It intends to reduce ‘the proportion of time spent in 
participating in formal consultation processes’.42
 
In Tanzania, when all CSOs were asked if there had been any positive impacts on 
the final PRSP document the most common areas mentioned were gender policy and 
pastoralist rights. When high capacity groups were asked to be more specific about 
the precise policy changes, policy addressing female genital mutilation, violence 
against women, and inheritance were the primary areas where civil society felt they 
had achieved a positive outcome through PRSP.43   The CSOs which were perceived 
by their peers to be the most influential in policy analysis and activism were Haki 
Elimu44, Haki Kazi Catalyst45, Tanzania Media Women’s Association (TAMWA), 
Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP), PINGOS, and the Policy Forum 
network (formerly NGO Policy Forum).46  The sectoral areas most frequently 
mentioned were gender mainstreaming, educational policy, and pastoralists’ rights.   
 
In contrast, the majority of civil society groups in Ethiopia (76.5 %) were not involved 
in the first PRSP process in any way.47   The level of disconnect with the process 
was such that almost two thirds of the sample felt unable to answer any questions on 
civil society involvement in PRSP as they did not even have knowledge of the 
experience of other groups who had been involved.   Of those who answered 
questions in this area (only 37% of the sample) almost one third of those answering 
thought CSOs had simply been given information, 18% said civil society was 
‘consulted’ and 22% said there was ‘active participation’.  Of those who said their 
organisation had actually been involved in the process in some way and who felt they 
could comment on the document (which was only just over 20% of all CSOs 
surveyed), approximately half of those replying said there had been ‘some’ impact on 
                                                 
41 For example, the Communications TWG has 17 to 23 seats of which six to twelve are reserved for 
government, two for academic bodies, three for development partners, one for a UN Agency, three for 
civil society and two for the private sector.   
42 Policy Forum 2006 p4 -11  Instead, it intends to focus more on independent analysis and monitoring 
of policy developments, capacity development of members and making policy accessible and available 
to policy makers, civil society and the general public.  
43 Corrigan 2007: 21;  CIS, 2007d: 29. 
44 A high capacity  education sector CSO 
45 A CSO working on community development 
46 CIS, 2007d: 29. 
47 CIS, 2007e: 32-36. 
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the final document, with 22% saying no impact and 24% saying substantial impact.  
When asked to say what those impacts were, only 10% of these respondents could 
identify any area, even in the most general of terms – with ‘women’s issues’ being 
the most often mentioned followed by the vague ‘CSO perspectives’, ‘some social 
issues’ and ‘pastoralist issues’.48  The focus on gender and pastoralists (both areas 
of high donor interest) followed the pattern in Tanzania, though it has to be treated 
with caution given the very small number of Ethiopian CSOs who felt they knew 
anything about the PRSP. 
 
Of the three cases, the PRSP process has been most advanced and had the highest 
level of CSO engagement in Tanzania.  The relatively negative response of 
Tanzanian CSOs to the second PRSP process does not encourage optimism for the 
future development of the process in Ethiopia.  However other aspects of CSO 
advocacy experience in Tanzania and Central America provides a more positive 
model.  As mentioned above, those Tanzanian CSOs dissatisfied with the PRSP 
process are not withdrawing from advocacy, rather than are shifting their focus to 
direct engagement with their own state institutions.  Likewise in Central America, 
notwithstanding the history of political polarisation, CSOs are today more focused on 
engaging with the state and its policy forums that previously.  While a substantial 
minority saw increased engagement with the state in negative terms, as a loss of 
social movement radicalism, the majority now see this form of institutional 
engagement as being necessary to advance a pro-poor agenda.49
 
In engaging in advocacy with the state, Tanzanian civil society see networking as a 
source of strength, especially in dealing with a strong national government based on 
a dominant party with popular grassroots support.  Only two CSOs in the entire 
sample were not members of at least one network and many were involved in 
multiple networks.  National networks had a high level of recognition amongst civil 
society groups and were perceived to be legitimate and successful.  In Central 
America, which has a dense set of CSO networks, there is concern that the focus on 
advocacy and consultation roles is resulting in the growth of narrowly-focused issue 
or sectoral networks rather than more generalist networks that have a broad anti-
poverty focus.  Issue networks are seen as more ‘professional’ sources of expert 
knowledge, fitting better into NGO consultative models, but ultimately less radical in 
that they cannot focus on the structural causes of poverty and inequality and often 
                                                 
48 CIS, 2007e: 34. 
49 CIS, 2007f: 21. 
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cannot rely on a wide popular membership and support.  In contrast to both Tanzania 
and Central America, the relative weakness of civil society in Ethiopia was expressed 
in a very low level of networking with less than half of all Ethiopian CSOs being a 
member of any civil society network – and just one organisation the Christian Relief 
and Development Association (CRDA) featured.  The type of engagement with 
CRDA was of a very low level for most CSOs – essentially receiving information, 
rather than engaging in any strategic planning or mobilisation.50  
 
In Tanzania and Central America civil society is increasing in capacity and building its 
engagement with the state, through both institutionalised policy forums and more 
informal vehicles of advocacy and protest.  While Ottaway and Carothers found little 
evidence of effective advocacy,51 here it is argued that in Tanzania and Central 
America there is clear evidence that groups utilising donor funding have built this 
capacity.  In Ethiopia, where civil society organisation has not reached the level of 
the two other cases, there are a particular set of obstacles. Most prominent is the 
fractured nature of the state and the very tense relationship between government and 
opposition at national level.  Civil society in this context has a much lower level of 
focus on advocacy at the level of national government, compared to their advocacy 
work aimed at local and regional government.  There is also the issue of the 
comparatively low levels of aid received by Ethiopia, including aid for civil society, 
and the crowding out of local groups by INGOs who have operated in the country 
since the early 1980s with the acquiesce of successive governments who did not 
tolerate the emergence of strong, independent local civil society groups.  This 
situation is improving and has the potential to change.   Problematic as donor funding 
for civil society has been, across all three case studies it seems that the availability of 
these funds, pressure on the state to conform to international norms and a 
willingness amongst local CSOs to organise, is creating new relationships between 
state and civil society and opening up some space for effective advocacy. 
 
 
                                                 
50 CIS, 2007e: 34-36. 




In all the case studies, including Ethiopia where civil society was weakest, CSOs 
active in the area of gender were perceived to be comparatively successful.  This 
finding supports those of Ottaway and Carothers who found that groups with a focus 
on gender issues were the only civil society success stories.52  In all three case 
studies, civil society organisations that focused on issues or services relevant to 
women made up a significant percentage of all groups.  In Tanzania it was the 
primary focus of 22% of groups; in Ethiopia 37% of groups who engaged in advocacy 
did so on women’s issues; in Central America 47% of organisations has a significant 
focus on women’s issues, rising to over 50% in El Salvador and Nicaragua.   
 
In Tanzania women’s organisations are seen across civil society as particularly 
effective and well organised.  In opened ended questions women’s networks were 
placed in the top three most significant networks nationally.  Women’s activism rather 
than the presence of a significant number of women in parliament is credited with 
achieving policy reform favourable to women.53   In Tanzania four issues surfaced as 
the most often-cited evidence for the positive impact of civil society advocacy - 
progress on gender reform, the SOSPA (Sexual Offences Special Provisions Act of 
1998), MKUKUTA54, and Land, listed in order of significance.  Three of the four most-
mentioned issues (Gender, SOSPA and Land) have obvious strong gender-related 
aspects, and gender was a key area in which civil society was considered to have  
influenced the MKUKUTA.  The Tanzania Media Women’s Association, was at the 
forefront of activism and advocacy that led ultimately to the SOSPA Act (sometimes 
also referred to as “the TAMWA Act”).55  This Act contains strong penalties for rape 
and domestic violence and also makes female genital mutilation of girls under age 18 
a crime. The Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP) was believed to be 
influential in gender policy reforms generally, including the Gender Budget Initiative.   
 
In Ethiopia, almost one third of all CSOs in the country engaged in advocacy (over 
22% of all CSOs surveyed) are doing so on ‘women’s issues’.  Notwithstanding the 
levels of gender inequality in Ethiopia this seems an extraordinarily high percentage.   
Of these groups engaged in advocacy on women’s issues, one third of them are 
                                                 
52 Ottaway and Carothers, 2000. 
53  Women make up 30% of the national parliament, the majority via a reserved seats mechanism. 
54 MKUKUTA is the Kiswahili acronym for Tanzania’s PRS revised in 2005, Mkakati wa Kukuza 
Uchumi na Kuondoa wa Umaskini Tanzania, translated as the National Strategy for Growth and 
Reduction of Poverty.   
55 CIS, 2007d: 29. 
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working in the relatively narrow area of ‘gender based violence’, currently a key area 
of donor interest.56  This means that over 7% of the entire sample (a sample made 
up of a very diverse range of groups) were engaged in advocacy on ‘gender based 
violence’.  If the groups engaged on advocacy on ‘harmful traditional practices’, 
included by some under ‘gender based violence’, are added then over 10% of the 
entire survey group are active in this area.  This point is not intended to undermine 
the importance of advocacy on this issue, it is intended to stress that if Ethiopian civil 
society was setting its own agenda, it is unlikely that such a high percentage of 
groups would be clustered in this relatively narrow area of advocacy.  Given the 
priority this topic has been given in donor agendas recently, especially following the 
adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 132557, it suggests that civil society’s 
advocacy priorities are being influenced by donor funding.  That is not to say that this 
is not a significant area for action, but that the resources for campaigning are being 
made available for those areas in which donors have an interest and are not perhaps 
being defined by the domestic priorities of indigenous women’s groups.  
 
Table 2: Ethiopia – issues of focus for CSOs engaged in advocacy on women’s 
issues 
  No of groups 






% of entire 
sample 
Gender based violence 19 32% 7.1 
Women empowerment 15 25% 5.6 
Reproductive health 11 18% 4.1 
HTP (Harmful traditional 
practices) 9 15% 
 
3.6 
Prostitution 6 10% 2.2 
Total 60 100% 22.4 
    
 
 
The existence of explicit international norms on gender, and a strong international 
network of women’s organisations, has undoubtedly assisted in channelling donor 
funds into these internationally defined priority areas.  But isolating some of the 
distinguishing features of ‘women’s’ civil society organisations compared to civil 
society more generally highlights other factors that could explain the perceived 
success of these groups. 
 
                                                 
56 O’Neill and Connolly, 2007. 
57 O’Neill and Connolly, 2007: 85-86. 
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The social movement basis of many women’s organisations gives them a different 
character and structure to the majority of CSOs.  It means they are more rooted in 
communities and networks of women.  Another important aspect of their social 
movement foundation is that they have an ideological motivation for their activism, 
which makes them more effective agents of change, and also allows them to 
effectively interact with international women’s networks, with whom they have a 
shared perspective.  The UN provides an important site for this networking, as well 
as serving an agenda setting function.58
 
Although Tanzania and Ethiopia did not experience ‘second wave’ feminism as a 
social force in the way it was experienced in developed states, women’s activism has 
a long history.  The independence movements in both African states, and the political 
parties which represented them, all had organised women’s sections, which 
interacted with feminist based social movement activity.  There was also a strong 
women's movement in the Derge era in Ethiopia which saw the establishment of 
network of women associations in the country.  Given that these associations were 
formed within the prevailing ideology at the time many collapsed following the change 
of government in 1991 but  they laid roots for the emergence of active advocacy on 
women issues in more favourable conditions.   Similarly, women’s organisations 
played a key role in the Tanzanian independence movement and, prior to the 
introduction of multiparty democracy, CCM had a substantial women’s section, with a 
network of local groups.  In Central America women’s organisations played a key role 
in pro-democracy movements and in resistance to repressive states, as well as 
engaging in women’s rights activism.  This mobilisation of women, together with the 
limitations on women gaining influence in formal political and economic structures, 
after the transition to democracy in both states, has produced a strong motivation for 
women’s civil society engagement.  Policy norms in developed states have 
embedded, if only superficially, ideas of ‘gender mainstreaming’ and ‘gender equality’ 
into formal policy documents, including development policy, allowing some funding to 
be attached to these policy areas.  As a result there has been a level of congruence 
between the existing CSOs with a focus on women’s issues in developing states, a 
gender based funding stream in donor policy and international networks of women’s 
rights activists, including INGOs, to facilitate the distribution of those funds.  
However, gender issues are still seen as marginal to the power relationships on 
which states and political systems are based.  This has allowed states to adopt 
                                                 
58 Exemplified by the strong and ongoing impact of the Beijing declaration; O’Neill And Connolly, 2007: 
3. 
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gender reforms which are limited in their impact but which allow the states involved to 






The relationship between donor support and Southern civil society development 
remains problematic and complex. However, despite these problems, a combination 
of funding streams and international pressures has opened opportunities for the 
development of a particular form of civil society.  The civil society that has emerged is 
not free from donor influence but neither is it a creation of donor policies.  In order to 
exist, civil society organisations may have to adapt to international funding pressures 
to some extent, but this does not mean that they lack independent agency.   While in 
Ethiopia, with the weakest level of civil society development, the areas of civil society 
activism were most skewed by donor agendas; in Tanzania, where civil society was 
stronger,  the skewing of its agenda was less rather than more marked, despite the 
fact that it received more donor funding; and in Central America, where civil society is 
more deeply developed it has considerable autonomy from donor agenda’s  despite 
high levels of financial dependence on donors.   
 
Civil society plays crucial roles in each of the three cases reviewed in this paper, 
essential for building democracy and pro-poor development.  In Central America, civil 
society support is a potentially important vehicle for strengthening the still fragile 
democracies and for promoting more egalitarian public policies in societies where 
poverty is associated with deep inequality.  In Tanzania, where, in common with 
many African states, there is no effective opposition party, civil society deepens 
public debate and provides an alternative voice in national decision making.  In 
Ethiopia, civil society, though still weak, provides a vehicle for dialogue at local and 
regional level.  This needs to be better resourced and perhaps has the potential to 
play a stronger role at national level, in a context where dialogue between 
government and political opposition is polarised and focused purely on the holding of 
political power.  In each of the three cases civil society is playing a positive role and 
positive development outcomes would be achieved through a deeper engagement 
with civil society. 
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Across the three cases the comparative success of groups working on gender is the 
result of a number of factors.  The presence of international norms on gender 
equality and gender based violence have provided a framework in which women’s 
rights activists from both the developed and the developing world can lobby for the 
inclusion of policy commitments from donors and IFIs, and also to have funding 
attached to these commitments.  The case study countries all have a long history of 
women’s activism which provides the roots and personnel for the current array of 
women’s rights based CSOs, which also have access to strong and supportive 
international networks, dealing with both the broad concerns of international women’s 
rights and the more immediate concerns of gender and development.  In addition, 
these networks are institutionally connected to the structures of the United Nations, 
giving them additional strength and legitimacy.  This means that the activities of an 
individual CSO can take place within a support structure that can also act as a way of 
accessing funds.  It also means that domestic advocacy is linked to international 
processes of advocacy and policy diffusion, which are neither primarily state nor 
donor led.  In this way, the experiences of CSOs working on gender issues points to 
the importance of international networking as well as national networking for building 
successful advocacy.  This point was also evident in the Central American study, 
where building CSO networks at the regional level   was considered important in the 
face of new challenges to the region in the form of the free trade bloc, CAFTA-DR. 
 
Policy on and funding for civil society amongst OECD donor states has shared a 
similar trajectory over the past five years. In spite of a policy position that validates 
the direct funding of Southern civil society, such funding has increased only 
marginally, from a very low base.  Funding for Northern development NGOs has 
either been maintained or increased, with the almost universal requirement that these 
organisations move towards working through partner organisations in developing 
countries rather than through direct provision.  There is evidence that there is a 
certain amount of donor fatigue on the issue of civil society funding and there is less 
emphasis on civil society in the 2006 DFID white paper, for example, compared to 
earlier documents.59  This fatigue is driven by a wide range of factors including: 
criticism of the manner in which donors had engaged with CSOs; the very real 
difficulties of that engagement in particular around issues of CSO legitimacy and 
capacity; the high management costs to donors of funding lower capacity civil society 
groups; the apparent failure to achieve definite results; and the shift of focus in wider 
                                                 
59 See DFID, 2006. 
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donor policy discourse towards a renewed emphasis on the role of the state and the 
governance agenda. 
 
Irish Aid is unusual in that it has increased its focus on civil society during this period.  
A new civil society unit was established in 2002 and the following year the OECD 
peer review of Irish Aid argued that given Irish Aid’s focus on bilateral aid to 
governments, a strong civil society programme would form a useful complement.  
Civil society dimensions were developed in country strategy papers and a new policy 
on engagement with civil society was published following a government white paper 
on Irish Aid in 2006.  At the same time funding for Irish NGOs in particular has 
increased significantly, in line with the rapid growth in the overall budget for Irish Aid 
and most Irish NGOs are now increasing their focus on working with Southern CSOs.  
However in the context of the current dominance of the governance agenda, the role 
envisaged for civil society, even in Irish Aid, has become narrower and there is now a 
greater focus on upward accountability to donors on the part of both civil society and 
the state, with less emphasis being placed on the broader democratic, human rights 
and pro-poor roles of civil society.60  Supporting a broader role of civil society was a 
strength of the Irish Aid programme and should remain an important part of their 
future practice.    
 
A central plank of the governance agenda promoted by the World Bank is the PRSP 
process, which gives a significant place to civil society, or at least to a consultative 
process in which civil society is centrally involved.  Southern civil society has 
however demonstrated its disenchantment with this process as it currently exists, 
while at the same time engaging in effective advocacy and mobilisation outside the 
PRSP process, through diverse avenues of engagement with their respective states.  
Harmonisation of policy amongst OECD donors contains the danger of emphasising 
the PRSP consultative role of Southern civil society (that CSOs consider less 
productive and more resource heavy) and also but to a lesser extent their small scale 
service provision, rather than their domestic advocacy and social mobilisation roles.   
This research clearly shows that Southern CSOs favour a broad approach to their 
work and are critical of the narrow range of donor interests and funding mechanisms.  
There is also evidence that Southern CSOs are successfully playing a more positive 
role in a wide range of poverty alleviation activity, including advocacy, than was 
suggested by the Carnegie Study of the late 1990s.    Donors need to ensure that 
                                                 
60 Connolly and O’Neill (2007 forthcoming) 
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support mechanisms for civil society support a broad range of organisations, with an 
emphasis on their broader role in poverty alleviation, development and 
democratisation, and not simply focus on narrowly defined consultation mechanisms. 
 
Donors are criticised by those measuring aid effectiveness, if they engage in too 
many small projects, which together with the associated management burden of this 
type of funding makes the direct support of Southern civil society difficult and could 
lead to a reduction in commitments, or a failure to increase this aspect of aid as 
budgets increase. Donors need to continue to support a wide range of civil society 
groups in developing states. They should do this as direct funding for high capacity 
organisations and networks which can cope with their administrative requirements, 
and such organisations should be included in funding mechanisms on the same 
basis as INGOs, in addition to being supported through country strategy 
programmes.  Supporting CSOs with lower levels of capacity and capacity building 
programmes will require the administration of large numbers of small grants and 
good local knowledge.  No donor has developed successful mechanisms to deal 
directly with this type of support due to staffing restrictions and administrative 
pressures.  This type of aid should be channelled through Northern development 
NGOs.  The personnel practices and ethos of Northern NGOs make them better 
suited to this task.  Many of the larger Irish development NGOs are already involved 
in capacity building programmes or have for many years worked through local 
partners.  There is sufficient expertise in the sector to take on this role and the 
positive experience of the existing working relationships between Irish Aid and the 
NGO sector suggest this could be done effectively. 61  This type of programme, 
aimed at lower capacity CSOs should exist in all programme countries and if it is to 
be carried out by INGOs this will require a greater degree of coordination between 
Irish Aid country strategy papers and the INGOs involved in this work in-country than 
has been normal up to now.  
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